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ABSTRACT
Background
The United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recently recommended
opt-out HIV testing (testing without the need for risk assessment and counseling) in all health
care encounters in the US for persons 13–64 years old. However, the overall costs and
consequences of these recommendations have not been estimated before. In this paper, I
estimate the costs and public health impact of opt-out HIV testing relative to testing
accompanied by client-centered counseling, and relative to a more targeted counseling and
testing strategy.
Methods and Findings
Basic methods of scenario and cost-effectiveness analysis were used, from a payer’s
perspective over a one-year time horizon. I found that for the same programmatic cost of
US$864,207,288, targeted counseling and testing services (at a 1% HIV seropositivity rate)
would be preferred to opt-out testing: targeted services would newly diagnose more HIV
infections (188,170 versus 56,940), prevent more HIV infections (14,553 versus 3,644), and do so
at a lower gross cost per infection averted (US$59,383 versus US$237,149). While the study is
limited by uncertainty in some input parameter values, the findings were robust across a
variety of assumptions about these parameter values (including the estimated HIV
seropositivity rate in the targeted counseling and testing scenario).
Conclusions
While opt-out testing may be able to newly diagnose over 56,000 persons living with HIV in
one year, abandoning client-centered counseling has real public health consequences in terms
of HIV infections that could have been averted. Further, my analyses indicate that even when
HIV seropositivity rates are as low as 0.3%, targeted counseling and testing performs better
than opt-out testing on several key outcome variables. These analytic findings should be kept
in mind as HIV counseling and testing policies are debated in the US.
The Editors’ Summary of this article follows the references.
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In September 2006, the US Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) recommended that routine opt-out HIV
testing (testing without the need for risk assessment and
counseling) be offered in all health care settings in the nation
(including substance use treatment settings, correctional
health care facilities, emergency and urgent care clinics,
primary care settings, and all public health and community
health care clinics) [1]. Such testing is to be offered to all 13-
to 64-year-old persons in health care. Routine opt-out testing
m a ye v e n t u a l l yb ed i s c o n t i n u e di nl o c a l e sw h e r eH I V
seroprevalence is documented at less than 0.1%. CDC
acknowledged that some time-consuming aspects of HIV
counseling and testing would need to be removed in order to
make routine testing a reality in busy clinical settings.
Consent to HIV testing would now accrue from general
medical consent, not from speciﬁc written consent for the
HIV test itself. No risk assessment or pretest counseling
would be required. Post-test counseling may be offered for
HIV-seronegative persons at high behavioral risk so long as
the counseling does not become a barrier to routine testing.
For persons who test HIV seropositive, linkages are to be
provided to care, treatment, and prevention services, but
scant detail is provided by CDC as to how this is to be
achieved.
These recommendations have been met with strong
reactions of both support and concern. For instance, the
American Medical Association (AMA) welcomed the CDC
recommendations in a press statement [2]. The AMA noted
the importance of early diagnosis for persons living with HIV
(especially for the roughly 250,000 persons living with HIV
who do not know it), and the need to reduce HIV trans-
mission to others. On the other hand, the American Civil
Liberties Union has raised concerns about the lack of speciﬁc
informed consent and the potential for coercive testing
practices [3]. The National Association of People with AIDS
has endorsed the expansion of HIV testing, but is concerned
about informed consent issues as well as the lack of
counseling services [4]. The latter is a critical issue because
client-centered counseling accompanying HIV testing has
been shown in a CDC-sponsored randomized controlled trial
to reduce incident sexually transmitted disease infections by
about 20%, and up to 40% in adolescents [5,6]. Further, when
this trial was published, CDC stated that client-centered HIV
counseling was both effective and practical in real-world
settings [7].
Prior to CDC’s recent release of opt-out HIV testing
recommendations, the US Preventive Services Task Force, a
panel of health care experts that evaluates the scientiﬁc
evidence on clinical preventive services, chose not to
recommend for or against routine testing [8]. While the task
force endorsed the beneﬁts of HIV treatment for persons
testing HIV seropositive, it raised screening-related concerns
about stigma, violence, abandonment, psychological impacts,
and negative test results possibly providing ‘‘false reassurance
if high-risk behaviors are continued’’ [8].
Given the level of intense discussion about the CDC
recommendations, it is worth noting that neither CDC nor
any of the organizations endorsing the recommendations
have estimated the potential costs and consequences of
routine opt-out testing. CDC has asserted that it is too early
to know what the costs and consequences might be [9,10].
However, this seems at odds with the emphasis by the US
Ofﬁce of Management and Budget, the White House ofﬁce
responsible for devising and submitting the US president’s
annual budget proposal to Congress, on conducting cost–
beneﬁt and cost-effectiveness analyses for federal policies and
programs [11]. Recent articles have used cost-effectiveness
analysis to determine the cost per quality-adjusted life year
saved for routine screening at various levels of background
HIV seroprevalence; however, none of these publications
examined the overall costs and public health impact of CDC’s
recommendations [12–14]. Even though neither CDC nor
AMA knows the overall costs and consequences of these
recommendations, both have already raised the issue of
addressing state laws that require HIV-speciﬁc informed
consent for testing and client-centered counseling. AMA has
asked states to ‘‘re-examine’’ their laws so as to allow CDC’s
new guidelines to be carried out [2]. CDC has obliquely
encouraged its partners to consider taking steps to resolve
existing conﬂicts between the recommendations and state
laws [1].
In this paper, I estimate the overall costs of CDC’s routine
HIV testing recommendations, estimate the potential impact
of these recommendations in terms of persons newly learning
of their HIV infection, and estimate the number of potential
infections averted in the US (there are roughly 40,000 new
HIV infections each year in the nation) [15]. Further, I
estimate the medical care resources that will need to be made
available quickly to meet the clinical needs of persons newly
diagnosed with HIV. For comparative purposes, four distinct
scenarios are examined: (a) opt-out HIV testing as recom-
mended by CDC (the basic case analysis); (b) opt-out HIV
testing that induces increases in risk behavior due to lack of
counseling; (c) HIV testing accompanied by client-centered
counseling; and (d) using the same level of resources needed
for routine opt-out testing (as estimated in the analyses
shown here), a program of HIV counseling and testing
targeted to settings with a higher HIV seropositivity than is
found in typical health care settings.
Methods
Standard methods of scenario and cost-effectiveness
analysis were used to analyze the costs and consequences of
the four cases listed above. The analyses employed a payer’s
perspective [16,17] rather than a societal perspective so as to
best estimate the resources needed to implement CDC’s
recommendations. All costs are expressed in 2005 US dollars,
and all analyses were done in Microsoft Excel 2003 (http://
ofﬁce.microsoft.com); see Table S1 under Supporting Infor-
mation for the spreadsheet containing all formulae used here.
A one-year time horizon was employed so as to examine
intensively the initial impact of CDC’s recommendations and
the alternative scenarios. (In the Discussion section, the
results are interpreted for the reader interested in a societal
perspective and a multiyear time horizon.)
Table 1 contains the input parameter values for the basic
analysis, as well as the sources of the parameter values [18–
38]. Of course, some parameter estimates contain uncer-
tainty, and where parameter estimation called for judgment
to be made, I biased the estimates in favor of CDC’s opt-out
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ter values related to population size are self-explanatory.
CDC recently published data that show that 73% of persons
diagnosed with HIV in South Carolina had previously visited
a health care facility and could have been tested for HIV, had
routine testing been available [10,21]. This value may be high
for some populations heavily impacted by HIV with little
access to health care (such as homeless youth), but is the best
available estimate in the literature and likely biases the results
in favor of opt-out testing.
For simplicity, it was assumed here that all incident and
prevalent HIV infections in the US are among 13- to 64-year-
olds; this too gives a slight bias in favor of CDC’s
recommendations. The analyses assume that the CDC routine
HIV testing recommendations will achieve a ﬁrst-year uptake
of 52.2% (for a total of 109,620,000 HIV tests). This
percentage is the uptake level equal to that of other
recommended screening tests in the US [22]. However,
21.0% of the adult population is already being tested for
HIV [23], so the actual uptake of testing due to the new
recommendations is the difference between those two
percentages (i.e., 31.2%).
The analyses assume that a two-step rapid testing strategy is
to be used (an initial rapid HIV testing, followed by a
conﬁrmatory Western blot as necessary), as this would
maximize client receipt of test results and is consistent with
CDC’s emphasis on using rapid testing where possible [1,25].
The full cost of delivering a testing strategy with pre- and
post-test counseling (from a payer’s perspective) has been
estimated at US$28.18 for HIV-seronegative people and
US$103.92 for HIV-seropositive people [24,25]. Prior analyses
have estimated that about 61.5% of the cost of counseling and
testing for HIV-seronegative clients is attributable to coun-
seling (roughly half of that for pretest counseling, half for
post-test counseling) [26], bringing the testing-only cost down
to US$13.01. Removing pretest counseling for people testing
HIV seropositive reduces that expense by about US$7.59 to
US$96.93 (this assumes CDC would still recommend post-test
counseling to HIV-seropositive persons) [24,26]. My estimates
of the costs of testing services are within the ranges published
by Phillips and Fernyak [39]. (It is recognized that other
testing technologies are available—such as non-rapid testing
options—that may have slightly different cost levels; however,
this analytic framework can be used to examine any testing
technology of interest to the reader.)
The analyses separately calculate the number of persons
who newly learn that they are HIV seropositive, and the
number of persons who already know that they are HIV
seropositive but are tested (and test seropositive) again due to
new testing initiatives. Prior analyses have estimated that of
persons testing HIV seropositive, about 37% already know
they are HIV seropositive or do not return for results [24–29].
For persons who newly learn that they are HIV seropositive,
their medical care costs are estimated to be similar to those
experienced by persons receiving care at a large HIV clinic in
the southeastern US (where the median CD4 cell count is 367
and the range is 2 to 2,671) [30]. However, this estimate of
medical need for a newly diagnosed HIV-seropositive client
can be multiplied by a constant to reﬂect higher or lower
medical costs in any clinic population of interest.
To estimate the number of HIV infections averted, I ﬁrst
examined transmissions prevented from persons who newly
learn that they are HIV positive due to the proposed
program. It has been estimated that persons who are unaware
that they are living with HIV transmit at an 8.8% annual rate;
persons who are aware that they are living with HIV infection
have been estimated to transmit at a 2.4% rate [24,31–34].
Therefore, as persons learn of their HIV seropositivity, it is
assumed that their transmission rate drops accordingly. It
should be noted that omitting pretest counseling for persons
who test HIV seropositive may diminish this change in
transmission rate, but for the sake of simplicity such a
‘‘penalty’’ is not included here.
With these input parameters, I was able to calculate the
following outputs using basic algebra: (a) number of persons
tested under the recommended program; (b) number of
undiagnosed HIV-seropositive persons newly reached; (c)
total cost of testing program; (d) HIV transmissions averted;
(e) gross cost per transmission averted; and (f) public sector
medical care resources needed in one year to care for persons
Table 1. Input Parameters, Values, and Sources
Parameter Value Reference
Number of persons 13–64 years old in US 210,000,000 [18–20]
Number of persons living with HIV in US 1,000,000 [1,15]
Percentage of persons unaware that they are HIVþ 25% [1,15]
Percentage of newly diagnosed HIV patients previously in contact with health
care system
73% [10,21]
Uptake of screening recommendations 52.2% [22]
Adult population already receiving HIV testing 21.0% [23]
Persons testing HIVþ who are already aware of or do not receive results 37% [24–29]
Cost of counseling and testing for one HIV- client
a $28.18 [24,25]
Cost of counseling and testing for one HIVþ client
a $103.92 [24,25]
Annual per patient medical costs for one HIVþ patient
b $22,511 [30]
Transmission rate from unaware HIVþ persons 8.8% [24,31–34]
Transmission rate from aware HIVþ persons 2.4% [24,31–34]
Percentage of persons in age group at high risk of HIV infection 11.7% [35–37]
Percentage of HIVþ persons uninsured or on public health care assistance 75% [38]
aSee text for description of fraction of counseling and testing costs due to counseling.
bReflects a mixture of clients at CD4 cell levels reflective of a large, experienced HIV clinic in a Southern US city.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040194.t001
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calculates these outputs using the inputs described above is
labeled the ‘‘Basic Case Analysis (Opt-Out Testing).’’
In line with CDC’s recommendations, the Basic Case
Analysis (Opt-Out Testing) makes a simplifying assumption
that the removal of HIV counseling for seronegative persons
at high behavioral risk of infection does no harm. This
assumption is counter to the literature, which notes that
client-centered counseling accompanying testing can reduce
incident sexually transmitted infections by 20% (or even
more among adolescents) [5–7]. Therefore, I created and
assessed alternative scenarios.
The ‘‘Behavioral Offset Case Analysis’’ is exactly the same
as the Basic Case Analysis (Opt-Out Testing) with one
exception. It has been estimated by CDC’s National Center
for Health Statistics that roughly 11.7% (11.9% in one
publication) of the US population 15–44 years old is at high
behavioral risk of HIV infection [35–37]. I make a simplifying
assumption that this percentage holds for 13- to 64-year-olds
but recognize that the actual percentage is not known and
may vary by age. (Note that the Basic Case Analysis is actually
the same as a Behavioral Offset Case sensitivity analysis but
assumes that 0.0% rather than 11.7% of persons are at high
behavioral risk.) It is possible that persons at high risk of HIV
infection who are tested via CDC’s recommended program
(which omits risk assessment and counseling for HIV sero-
negative persons) could actually increase their risk behavior.
For instance, if an injecting drug user who is given an opt-out
HIV test without being questioned about substance use or
counseled about risk gets an HIV-negative result, the
individual could easily take that testing experience as a
conﬁrmation that injecting drugs is not posing an HIV-
related risk. Indeed, some persons repeatedly seeking HIV
testing use the experience as a risk conﬁrmation strategy
[40,41]. Further, CDC and Kaiser Family Foundation have
estimated that roughly four in ten persons in the US have
some basic misconceptions about HIV [42,43]. Hence, perfect
HIV-related knowledge cannot be assumed among patient
populations. In the Behavioral Offset Case, the rate of HIV
incidence is calculated for persons at high risk of infection
tested under CDC’s recommended program, and it is assumed
that the rate increases by 5% due to behavioral offset. This
behavioral offset parameter is not known with much
precision and suggests an important area for additional
research.
Next, I created a Routine Counseling and Testing Case.
This case assumed that clients received counseling and testing
(but if someone reported no risk behaviors and tested HIV
negative, no post-test counseling would be needed). While the
additional counseling in this scenario would of necessity
increase the cost relative to the basic program, this counsel-
ing would prevent infections among high-risk seronegative
persons. The best available estimate in the literature for the
effect size of counseling among high-risk seronegative
persons is 20% [5–7]. So as not to overstate the case for
counseling (and so as to ensure that any potential bias is in
favor of opt-out testing rather than against it), that effect size
is reduced here to 15%. In other words, it was assumed that
the number of incident HIV infections among HIV-sero-
negative persons at high risk of infection is reduced by 15%
due to the provision of client-centered counseling and
testing. Given that a small number of HIV-seronegative
persons would fail to get their results even in a rapid testing
situation, this beneﬁt is decreased by 1% (consistent with
prior peer-reviewed analyses) [24].
Once the estimated cost of the Basic Case program is
known, another type of analysis is possible. Recently, the US
president proposed US$93 million for targeted HIV counsel-
ing and testing efforts in the US (focusing particularly on
incarcerated populations, persons in drug treatment, and
other persons in clinical and community-based service
delivery settings at high risk of undiagnosed or imminent
HIV infection). I have previously estimated that the presi-
dent’s proposed US$93 million counseling and testing
initiative might (in one year) identify as many as 26,984
undiagnosed persons living with HIV, and prevent up to 2,537
transmissions and infections at an average cost of US$36,663
each [24]. I used this framework of a targeted counseling and
testing program analysis here to ask, ‘‘At the level of
resources needed to fund CDC’s recommended routine
testing program, what would be the impact of a targeted
counseling and testing program?’’ Hence, a scenario labeled
‘‘Targeted Counseling and Testing’’ was created.
In the Targeted scenario, it was assumed that the level of
available resources for service delivery was the same as that
estimated in the Basic Case Analysis described above (in other
words, the resource level output of the Basic Case Analysis
was used as the resource level input in the Targeted
Counseling and Testing analysis). Besides the other input
parameters in Table 1, additional assumptions were needed
for this scenario. Given that this case assumes a highly
targeted program, it would be possible to essentially ensure
that counseling and testing was offered only to persons at
high risk of infection. However, this percentage was instead
assumed to be 50%, so as to allow for some offering of
counseling and testing to lower-risk persons in areas of
higher HIV seroprevalence. This scenario analysis assumes
that 1% of persons being tested are HIV seropositive (which
is less than the 1.5% seropositivity typically seen in publicly
funded HIV counseling and testing sites in the US and used in
previously published analyses) [24,25]. Since this targeting
might be achieved via ongoing surveillance and evaluation
activities, no additional costs were allocated for additional
targeting efforts or outreach; however, the assumptions about
the ability of this program to reach populations with high
HIV seropositivity was examined in sensitivity analyses.
Results
Table 2 displays the results of the Basic Case Analysis (Opt-
Out Testing), the Behavioral Offset Case Analysis, the Routine
Counseling and Testing Case Analysis, and the Targeted
Counseling and Testing Case Analysis. (Table S1 provides
supplementary information on the spreadsheet used to
conduct the analyses.) In the Basic Case, CDC’s recommended
program of opt-out testing could be expected to test 65.5
million persons, newly identify HIV infection in 56,940 out of
a total of 250,000 persons in the US unaware that they are
living with HIV, and avert 3,644 (out of 40,000) HIV
transmissions in one year at a programmatic cost of
US$864.2 million (compared to CDC’s annual HIV preven-
tion budget of a bit over US$700 million per year [44]). The
cost per HIV infection averted is US$237,149. In one year,
public support in the amount of US$961.3 million would be
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who are on public assistance or uninsured.
The Behavioral Offset Case Analysis found that the lack of
risk assessment and counseling for the 7.6 million persons at
high behavioral risk of infection tested in this program might
increase infections by 569 over one year, thereby making the
net number of transmissions averted 3,076 over one year (and
increasing the cost per infection averted to US$280,993).
The Routine Counseling and Testing Case Analysis found
that with the provision of the additional counseling services
to HIV-seronegative persons at behavioral risk of infection,
the cost of the program would rise to US$1,419.3 million.
However, it would avert an additional 1,689 HIV infections
and the cost per infection averted would be US$266,128. This
cost per infection averted is intermediate between (but highly
similar to both) the Basic Case and the Behavioral Offset
Case.
The Targeted Counseling and Testing Case outperforms
the other scenarios. It is tied for least expensive, newly
identiﬁes more persons living with HIV (188,170), prevents
more transmissions (12,043), and prevents more HIV infec-
tions among at-risk seronegative persons (2,510) for a cost per
infection averted of US$59,383. As this scenario outperforms
the others by a wide margin, it would still perform better even
if substantial additional costs were needed for targeting and
outreach program components. Of course, by identifying
more persons living with HIV, this scenario increases the
public resources needed for medical care in one year to
US$3,176.9 million.
Table 3 displays a sensitivity analysis that shows the
robustness of the beneﬁts of Targeted Counseling and
Testing. Even if HIV seropositivity was as low as 0.3% and
even if there was no beneﬁt at all to providing counseling to
high-risk HIV-seronegative persons, Targeted Counseling and
Testing would still be (slightly) preferred over opt-out testing
without counseling.
Discussion
These analyses estimate that CDC’s recommended program
of routine opt-out HIV testing might reach 22.8% of the
250,000 persons in the US now unaware that they are living
with HIV. The program might prevent 9.1% of the 40,000
HIV infections that now occur annually in the US; if there is
behavioral offset (i.e., increases in risk behavior due to lack of
counseling), this percentage drops to 7.7%. Routine counsel-
ing and testing would cost substantially more to implement
than opt-out testing, but would avert 13.3% of incident HIV
infections in the US; considering both the additional costs
and beneﬁts, it is estimated that the cost per infection averted
is roughly the same when comparing routine counseling and
testing to either ‘‘testing-only’’ strategy.
If US$864.2 million could be made available for a testing or
counseling and testing program, it would appear that the
better investment would be a highly targeted program. This
targeting strategy could identify roughly three-fourths of
persons in the US now unaware that they are living with HIV
infection, and prevent about 36.4% of the incident HIV
infections. This targeted program could combine a mixture
of clinical and community-based counseling and testing
services to achieve a 1% seropositivity rate (and therefore,
may represent a hybrid clinical/community-based strategy
rather than a strictly community-based approach). This
ﬁnding is robust to changes in HIV seropositivity levels and
effectiveness of client-centered counseling.
Of course, there are multiple limitations to the current
analysis. Many of the parameters in Table 1 are subject to
uncertainty (as acknowledged above). My analyses must be
continually updated as better parameter values become
available and policy descriptions are sharpened (indeed,
CDC has stated it will issue supplemental implementation
guidance over time) [10]. Further, I focused on the ﬁrst-year
costs and consequences of the recommendations so as to
illuminate the immediate ramiﬁcations of the recommenda-
tions. In future research, a multiyear analysis would be
desirable. However, the patient population, the health care
sector, the media, legislative bodies, and society at large are
always changing, and their reaction to the rollout of any of
the scenarios described above is impossible to predict with
complete precision; this changeability will make any multi-
year analysis an ongoing project. Nevertheless, the basic
results of a multiyear analysis can be anticipated. Holtgrave
Table 2. Costs and Consequences of Four HIV Testing or Counseling and Testing Scenarios
Outcome Basic Case
(Opt-Out Testing)
Behavioral
Offset Case
Routine Counseling
and Testing Case
Targeted Counseling
and Testing Case
Number of persons tested 65,520,000 65,520,000 65,520,000 29,868,308
Number of undiagnosed
HIVþ persons reached
56,940 56,940 56,940 188,170
Number of high-risk
HIV- persons reached
NA 7,649,048 7,649,048 14,636,964
Total program costs $864,207,288 $864,207,288 $1,419,250,220 $864,207,288
Transmissions averted 3,644 3,644 3,644 12,043
Infections averted Not relevant (569)
a 1,689 2,510
Transmissions and infections averted 3,644 3,076 5,333 14,553
Gross cost per transmission
or infection averted
$237,149 $280,993 $266,128 $59,383
Public support needed for HIV care $961,335,502 $961,335,502 $961,335,502 $3,176,937,598
aIn this scenario, it is estimated that infections are increased by 569 rather than averted.
NA, not applicable
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040194.t002
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infections per year over a ten-year time horizon in the US at
various levels of awareness of HIV seropositivity (from 75%
awareness to 100%) [34]. They found a divergent pattern in
incidence over time given various starting levels of awareness
of HIV seropositivity. For example, using an HIV-speciﬁc
death rate to reﬂect mortality, at 75% awareness, annual HIV
incidence would grow from 40,000 to 48,526 over a ten-year
time frame. However, if 95% awareness of seropositivity were
achieved in one year, annual HIV incidence would start at
27,200 in one year and grow more slowly to 29,458 over a
decade. If the four service delivery scenarios described in the
present paper were all one-year campaigns (with all pro-
grammatic costs incurred in year one), then such a divergent
pattern of HIV incidence levels in subsequent years might be
anticipated; in other words, if the targeted counseling and
testing scenario modeled here is to be preferred in year one
in terms of reduced HIV transmission and incidence, it is also
likely to be preferred in downstream years as well in terms of
reduced transmission and incidence. Of course, if the
scenarios used counseling and testing campaigns of relatively
different time frames, then a new multiyear analysis would be
required.
Also, due to space limitations not all of the sensitivity
analyses performed in this study are presented here; however,
given that the formulae employed are straightforward
algebraic expressions, the results of these sensitivity analyses
are easily anticipated (and can be conﬁrmed with the
spreadsheet in Table S1). Table 3 presents what was found
to be the most important scenario analysis, which provided
assurance of the superiority of a targeted testing strategy
even under rather extreme parameter assumptions.
I focused here on a payer’s perspective so as to highlight
the resources needed to implement CDC’s recommendations
or any of the other scenarios. Because of the substantial
diagnostic and preventive beneﬁts of the targeted counseling
and testing strategy, adding in productivity beneﬁts due to
early treatment or medical costs saved by averting more HIV
infections (as necessitated in a societal perspective analysis)
would only serve to make the targeted strategy appear even
more favorable. For instance, in a societal perspective
analysis, one could legitimately subtract from the cost per
HIV infection prevented by a counseling and testing program
the discounted, lifetime medical care costs of US$278,078 to
US$316,149 (2005 dollars) for one case of HIV disease averted
[45,46]. Given the gross costs per HIV infection averted
displayed in Tables 1 and 3, such a subtraction would lead us
to classify the scenarios as ‘‘cost-saving’’ (or very nearly so).
The only countervailing force would be if one differentially
added in client costs due to time spent in service delivery and
travel to receive targeted services; however, in sensitivity
analyses it was found that even if societal perspective client
costs doubled the per-client, payer perspective costs of
targeted HIV counseling and testing, the targeted strategy
still very clearly outperformed the opt-out strategy. Hence,
shifting to a different analytic perspective would not modify
my overarching, qualitative conclusion here.
Despite their limitations, the analyses presented here are
useful for several reasons. First, by laying out an explicit
framework for estimating the costs and consequences of
CDC’s recommended opt-out testing program, the analyses
help to sharpen the discussion about the merits of the
recommendations. Second, the analyses highlight research
needs regarding the value of various input parameters
necessary to further reﬁne that discussion. Third, even with
sources of uncertainty, the analyses give a general sense of
how much work will remain to be done in the HIV epidemic
even with such a program in place. Indeed, none of the
scenarios presented here should be mistaken for a compre-
hensive HIV prevention program—testing or counseling and
testing are important but only a piece of a comprehensive
national plan [37].
Fourth, the present analyses provide a general estimate of
the prevention and treatment resources that will need to be
raised to make CDC’s recommendations a reality. Fifth, by
estimating the costs of CDC’s recommendations, this analytic
framework allows for comparison of alternative counseling
and testing policies at a speciﬁed resource level. On this
point, the analyses presented here suggest that to maximize
public health impact, targeting and counseling elements
should be carefully considered for inclusion in national
testing policies. Given these strengths, the current analysis
provides insights beyond previous cost-effectiveness analyses
of expanded HIV testing [12–14,47].
Table 3. Costs and Consequences of Targeted HIV Counseling and Testing at Varying Levels of Seropositivity
Outcome Targeted Counseling
and Testing: 1%
Seropositivity
Targeted Counseling
and Testing: 0.3%
Seropositivity
Targeted Counseling and
Testing: 0.3% Seropositivity
and No Benefit of Counseling
HIV-Seronegative Persons
Number of persons tested 29,868,308 30,425,861 30,425,861
Number of undiagnosed HIVþ persons reached 188,170 57,505 57,505
Number of high-risk HIV- persons reached 14,636,964 15,015,619 NA
Total program costs $864,207,288 $864,207,288 $864,207,288
Transmissions averted 12,043 3,680 3,680
Infections averted 2,510 3,345 NA
Transmissions and infections averted 14,553 7,026 3,680
Gross cost per transmission or infection averted $59,383 $123,007 $234,819
Public support needed for HIV care $3,176,937,598 $970,872,510 $970,872,510
NA, not applicable
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040194.t003
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Background. About a quarter of a million people in the United States do
not realize they are infected with HIV. Because they are unaware of their
infection, they don’t get the medicines they need to stay healthy, and
they may also be transmitting HIV, the virus that causes AIDS, to others
unwittingly. How can public health professionals best reach such people
to offer them an HIV test? There are a number of different schools of
thought, the two most common of which are studied in this paper.
The first is that the best way to reach them is by simply offering every
single patient in every health care setting an HIV test, but giving them
the option to decline. This approach is known as ‘‘opt-out testing’’
(because everyone gets tested unless they choose to opt out); it has
recently been recommended by the leading US government agency
responsible for promoting the US public’s health, an agency called the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The CDC says that
there is no need for patients to give specific written permission for the
HIV test to be done and that there is no need for health professionals to
offer counseling of what the consequences of a positive test might mean
for them before the test.
The second school of thought is that public health professionals
should instead target their efforts towards those who are at increased
risk of being HIV positive, such as those who inject drugs or who have
had high-risk sex. Persons at risk of infection or transmission are offered
counseling before the test, to assess their actual risk of HIV and to
discuss what would happen in the event that the HIV test comes back
positive. During counseling, people are also given advice on steps they
can take to stay HIV negative if their test comes back negative, and to
prevent infecting others if their test comes back positive. This approach
to HIV testing is called ‘‘targeted counseling and testing.’’ While
targeting can be done according to levels of risk behavior, counseling
and testing services can also be targeted by focusing on geographic
areas (e.g., cities) with high levels of HIV infection, or focusing on
different types of clinics that serve persons at high risk of HIV infection
and/or with little routine access to health care (such as sexually
transmitted disease or drug treatment clinics, emergency rooms, or
medical clinics in prison settings).
Why Was This Study Done? The researcher, David Holtgrave, wanted to
know which of these two different approaches would be better at
reaching people with undiagnosed HIV infection over the course of a
one-year period. He also wanted to know the costs of each approach,
and which might be better at curbing the spread of HIV.
What Did the Researcher Do and Find? He used two research
techniques. One is called ‘‘scenario analysis,’’ which involves trying to
forecast the consequences of several different possible scenarios. The
other is called ‘‘cost-effectiveness analysis,’’ which involves comparing
the costs and effects of two or more different courses of action.
According to Dr. Holtgrave’s analysis, opt-out testing might reach 23%
of those people who are currently unaware that they are HIV positive.
The program might also prevent 9% of the 40,000 new HIV infections
that occur each year in the US. The cost of averting one new infection
would be US$237,149. In contrast, targeted counseling and testing might
identify about 75% of people in the US now unaware they are living with
HIV infection, and prevent about 36% of the new HIV infections. The cost
of averting one new infection would be US$59,383. Even when the
author changed several assumptions in his analysis (e.g., assumptions
about levels of HIV infection or the effectiveness of counseling), he found
that targeted counseling and testing still performed better (so the results
are ‘‘robust’’ across a variety of such assumptions).
What Do These Findings Mean? These findings suggest that targeted
counseling and testing would be better than opt-out testing for reaching
people with undiagnosed HIV infection and for helping to stop the
spread of the virus. Opt-out testing, says the author, might even make
some people increase their risky behavior. For example, if someone is
injecting drugs, is given an opt-out HIV test, but is never questioned
about substance use or counseled, and gets an HIV-negative result, they
could easily conclude that their drug injecting is not putting them at risk
of becoming HIV positive.
However, it is important to note that this study has a major limitation
in that it tried to predict what might happen in the future—it did not
study the actual impact of the two different types of testing on a group
of people. Studies such as this one, which try to predict the future, are
always based on a number of assumptions and these assumptions may
turn out not to be true. So we should always be cautious in interpreting
the results of a ‘‘scenario analysis.’’ In addition, because of the
assumptions made in this study, these results are only directly applicable
to the US population and hence the implications for other countries are
not clear.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via the online
version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.
0040194
  In a related Perspective on this article, Ronald Valdiserri discusses the
public health implications of the study
  The CDC has a Web site with information on national HIV testing
resources
  In addition, the CDC has published its ‘‘Revised Recommendations for
HIV Testing of Adults, Adolescents, and Pregnant Women in
Health-Care Settings,’’ which lay out its proposal for opt-out testing
  The international AIDS charity AVERT has a comprehensive page on
HIV testing, including information on the reasons to have a test and
what the test involves
  Johns Hopkins University is host to a site that provides extensive
information on HIV care and treatment
  The University of California at San Francisco maintains HIV InSite, an
authoritative Web site covering topics such as HIV prevention, care,
and policy
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